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Moral dilemmas in females: children
are more utilitarian than adults
Monica Bucciarelli *
Dipartimento di Psicologia, Centro di Scienza Cognitiva, Università di Torino, Torino, Italy
Influential theories on moral judgments propose that they rely either on emotions or
on innate moral principles. In contrast, the mental model theory postulates that moral
judgments rely on reasoning, either intuition or deliberation. The theory allows for the
possibility that intuitions lead to utilitarian judgments. This paper reports two experiments
involving fifth-grade children, adolescents, and adults; the results revealed that children
reason intuitively to resolve moral dilemmas in which action and inaction lead to different
outcomes. In particular, the results showed female children to be more utilitarian than
female adults in resolving classical moral dilemmas: they preferred an action that achieved
a good outcome for a greater number of people. Within the mental model theory’s
framework there is no reason to expect that females and males differ in their ability to
reason, but at the moment the results for females cannot be generalized to males who
were not properly represented in the adults groups of the two experiments. The result
revealing that (female) children are more utilitarian than (female) adults, which is hard to
explain via many current theories, was predicted by the mental model theory.
Keywords: moral dilemmas, utilitarianism, intuitions, deliberative reasoning, mental models
Introduction
Moral judgments pervade our daily life; we often engage in considerations on whether an action is
morally permissible or impermissible. The assumption underlying my investigation is that moral
judgments of this sort are grounded on reasoning. This idea was first introduced in psychology
by Piaget (1965/1932) and Kohlberg (1984), who tackled the question of which processes are
involved in moral judgment from a developmental perspective. They reported on many dialogs
conducted with children illustrating how they reason about what is right and what is wrong.
Many of the most recent theories on moral judgments are, instead, concerned with adults and
deny a role for reasoning. The socio-intuitionist theory argues in favor of emotions (Haidt, 2001,
2007) and the moral grammar theories argue in favor of innate moral principles (Mikhail, 2000,
2011; Hauser, 2006a). However, some theories on moral judgments underscore the importance
of deliberative thought in the process of moral evaluation (see Royzman et al., 2009; Paxton
et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014). In particular, the theory of mental models—henceforth, the
“model” theory—postulates thatmoral judgments rely on reasoning, either intuition or deliberation
(Johnson-Laird, 2006; Bucciarelli et al., 2008). Surprisingly, there are no studies confronting the
predictions of these theories in a population of children; they could enforce the assumptions of one
of these theories with respect to the other.
In the present investigation, following the assumptions of the model theory, I make a critical
prediction that contrasts with the assumptions of the socio-intuitionist and the moral grammar
theories: children are more utilitarian than adults when dealing with the classical moral dilemmas.
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The paper is organized as follows. First, I introduce the main
assumptions of the socio-intuitionist theory, the moral grammar
theories and the model theory. Second, I present a mental model
account of reasoning upon classical moral dilemmas, then I
describe two experiments involving children, adolescents and
adults whose scope was to test the predictions deriving from
the proposed account. In particular, as all but one participant in
the adults groups of the two experiments were females, I tested
model theory predictions for females. Finally, I discuss the results
of the experiments: children’s utilitarian judgments enforce the
assumptions of the model theory.
Current Theories of Moral Judgment
Upon hearing that a woman donated a kidney to a friend whowas
suffering from serious kidney problems, saving him from certain
death, one could experience an immediate positive emotion,
while upon hearing that a woman suffering from HIV has
voluntarily hidden her state of health from her new partner and
spread the disease, one could experience an immediate negative
emotion. Haidt (2001, 2007; see also Blair, 1995) proposes
a social-intuitionist theory in which moral evaluations come
from immediate intuitions and emotions. Thus, for example,
the positive emotion experienced in relation to the kidney
problem scenario would lead to judge the woman’s donation
as morally right, while the negative emotion experienced with
respect to the HIV scenario would lead to judge the woman’s
behavior as morally wrong. Haidt argues that moral evaluations
of this sort are fast, automatic and easy, based on an implicit
perception of the problem as a whole, a process more akin to
perception than reasoning (in line with Hume, 1978/1739), and
calls them “moral intuitions,” Moral intuitions are “the sudden
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an
affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious
awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing
evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).
For Haidt (2001, p. 814), “moral intuitions (including moral
emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments.” The
social component of Haidt’s theory postulates that conscious
reasoning about moral issues comes only after intuitions about
them, and that its role is to motivate moral judgments ex
post and to affect the intuitions and as a consequence other
people’s moral evaluations. Contrary to intuitions, conscious
reasoning occurs slowly, requires effort and includes at least
some steps that are accessible to consciousness. Haidt admits
the possibility of moral conflicts arising between intuitions; in
that case, the final judgment will depend either on following
the stronger intuition or on allowing deliberative reasoning to
choose between the alternatives by applying rules or principles
(Haidt, 2001). However, on rare occasions our moral evaluations
are based on reasoning (see also Haidt and Graham, 2007). In
Haidt’s view, Kohlberg’s results in favor of a role of reasoning
in moral judgments must be interpreted in relation to his
method of investigation. In particular, he used interviews that
forced kids to explain complex notions such as how to balance
competing concerns about rights and justice. As a result, their
responses to the interview reflected the complexity of language
rather than the complexity of the reasoning processes on which
they based their moral evaluations. Haidt argues that a proper
technique for testing children would be telling them short stories
followed by single yes-or-no probe questions. The developmental
prediction implicit in Haidt’s assumptions is that children,
like adults, base their moral judgments on their emotional
reactions.
A possibility in contrast with Haidt’s proposal is that
emotional reactions to moral scenarios are the results rather than
the cause of moral judgments. This position is maintained by
the moral grammar theories, which deny a role of emotions in
moral judgments. In particular, Mikhail (2000, 2011) and Hauser
(2006a) assume the existence of a universal moral grammar, a
series of principles operating at an unconscious level and guiding
moral judgments. The principles are abstract, lacking specific
content, and have nothing to do with emotions. Emotions follow
from unconscious moral judgments. Although emotions may
lead us to feel uneasy about our intuitions, they do not play
a causal role in our moral judgments (Mikhail, 2011, but also
Hauser, 2006b). Reasoning does not play a causal role either. The
moral grammar theories develop an idea originally advanced by
the philosopher Rawls (1971), who was the first to purport that a
moral theory can be modeled on aspects of Chomsky’s universal
grammar (see Chomsky, 1986). Mikhail (2011), for example,
purports that “ordinary individuals possess a complex moral
grammar that enables them to judge the deontic status of actions
in a manner roughly analogous to how native speakers intuitively
recognize the grammaticality of sentences” (ib., p. 309). By the
same analogy, as the universal grammar allows a native speaker
of a language to evaluate whether or not a string of words
corresponds to a sentence of the language, the moral grammar
theories implicitly assume that it is always possible to evaluate
an action as morally “right” or “wrong.” Consistent with the
linguistic analogy, moral grammar theories assume that a child
builds a particular moral system depending on the local culture
which sets the parameters in a particular way (see Hauser, 2006a,
p. 298). The resulting grammar automatically and unconsciously
generates judgments of right and wrong for an infinite variety
of acts and inactions. Some principles of the moral grammar
are “transnational and possibly even universal or nearly so”
(Mikhail, 2011, pp. 334–335). This conclusion, argues Mikhail,
runs counter to one of the most basic assumptions by Piaget and
Kohlberg according to which the adult’s and the child’s moral
competence are comprised of fundamentally different principles.
From the assumptions of the moral grammar theory descends the
prediction that some principles guide children’s moral judgments
to the same extent they guide those of adults.
The model theory, contrary to the socio-intuitionist and
moral grammar theories, argues that moral judgments rely
on reasoning. The model theory, originally aimed to explain
comprehension and reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006), has
been extended to account for moral judgment (Bucciarelli
et al., 2008). The theory makes two assumptions relevant
to the present investigation, which are summarized in two
principles.
Principle of independent systems. The principle postulates
two independent systems, one handles emotions and the other
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handles reasoning, and they operate in parallel. According
to this principle, the views that emotions can contribute to
moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001), and those
implying that moral evaluations can contribute to emotions
(Hauser, 2006b; Mikhail, 2011) are not correct. Bucciarelli
et al. (2008) conducted an experiment and found evidence that
there are scenarios, both moral and immoral, for which people
either experience an emotion first, or make an evaluation first,
or scenarios that are neutral in prevalence. Although moral
judgments rely on reasoning, emotions can contribute to moral
evaluations, and this may occur when, for instance, individuals
reason about their emotions (Johnson-Laird et al., 2006).
Principle of deontic reasoning. The principle postulates that
all deontic evaluations including those concerning matters of
morality depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions
or conscious reasoning. In line with dual-process accounts of
reasoning (for a review see Evans, 2010), the model theory
purports the existence of two systems of reasoning, one fast,
automatic and not subject to doubt, and the other slow,
deliberate, and able to consider more than one option at the
same time because it exploits working memory (Johnson-Laird,
2006). The former kind of reasoning is intuition (reasoning from
unconscious premises to conscious conclusions); the latter kind
of reasoning is deliberative reasoning (from conscious premises
to conscious conclusions). Hence, differently from Haidt who
argues that intuitions are contents of emotions, and fromMikhail
and Hauser who argue that they are the product of a series
of principles operating at an unconscious level, Johnson-Laird
argues that intuitions are a form of reasoning. In particular,
intuitions allow us to reason upon single possibilities, whereas
deliberations allow us to reason upon multiple possibilities. In
line with the assumption of the model theory that reasoning
about moral propositions is unlikely to depend on a special
process, and that it is merely normal deontic reasoning,
neuroimaging studies have not detected areas in the brain
specifically involved in moral judgments. Rather, several brain
areas appear to offer important contributions to the production
of a moral judgment (see Moll et al., 2008). Pascual et al.
(2013) reviewed the main brain areas that have been associated
with morality and observe that “the neural circuits of brain
regions implicated in morality overlap with those that regulate
other behavioral processes, suggesting that there is probably
no undiscovered neural substrate that uniquely supports moral
cognition.”
A third assumption relevant to my investigation is
summarized in a fundamental principle of the model theory:
Principle of parsimony. The mind, in order to reduce the
load on working memory, constructs salient mental models
rather than completemental models; salientmodelsmake explicit
as little information as possible. Thus, when the reasoning
task involves keeping multiple models in mind at once, we
tend to think about them one at a time (Johnson-Laird, 2006,
p. 203). As a consequence, we focus on that information
which is explicit in our models and fail to consider other
alternatives.
Legrenzi et al. (1993) argue that in many circumstances
focusing implies that individuals will fail to make a thorough
search for alternatives. In particular, if individuals are faced with
the choice of either carrying out a certain action or not carrying
it out, they will initially construct a model of the action and
an alternative model in which it does not occur. The latter will
be either implicit or else merely a model in which the action is
negated. Thus, the choice between going to the cinema or not
going to the cinema is represented by two disjunctive models.
The first model is explicit and exhaustive, and so the other
model, which corresponds to not going to the cinema, can be
implicit:
[c]
. . .
where the rows in this schematic diagram represent two distinct
possibilities: “c” denotes a model of going to the cinema and the
parentheses indicate that the model is explicit and exhaustive,
and the three dots denote the implicit model. Legrenzi et al.
(1993) invited the participants in their experiment to gather
information in order to be able to make a decision about
whether or not to carry out a certain action and found that
the participants tended to ask information about the action
rather than possible alternatives. These results support the
assumption that the participants were focused on the action to
the exclusion of possible alternatives. Focusing should be reduced
by any manipulation that makes alternatives to the action more
available. In particular, the context can enable individuals to
defocus by making alternatives available for fleshing out the
implicit model. At this point, the participants can compare the
attributes of the alternatives. A developmental assumption of the
model theory is that children, because of their limited cognitive
resources, are more likely than adults to construct and reason
upon the model of single possibilities. The deriving predictions
have been confirmed in both the factual (see Bara et al., 1995,
2001) and the deontic (see Bucciarelli, 2009) reasoning domains.
How the Theories Account for Moral
Judgments in Moral Dilemmas
The predictions of the socio-intuitionist theory, the moral
grammar theories and the model theory have been confronted
with respect to a set of moral dilemmas devised in the
philosophical literature (see Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1986); some of
these are known as “trolley problems.” The dilemmas involve two
disjunctive possibilities. Consider, for example, the footbridge
dilemma:
An empty boxcar is about to hit five people standing on the rail
track, and it will kill them. You can push a man onto the track.
Now, the boxcar will only hit that man and kill him, but the five
people on the rail track will be safe.
Pushing the one person is: (permissible/impermissible).
When presented with this dilemma, adults tend to say that it is
impermissible to kill one person to save five, while with the trolley
dilemma, a modified version of the footbridge dilemma in which
the killing of the one person occurs by redirecting the trolley onto
a siding where the person stands, they produce a greater number
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of permissible responses (Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al.,
2006). The trolley dilemma reads as follow:
An empty boxcar is about to hit five people standing on the rail
track, and it will kill them. You can pull a lever that sends the
boxcar down another track. Now, the boxcar will hit and kill one
man, but the five people on the rail track will be safe.
Pulling the lever is: (permissible/impermissible).
A utilitarian calculation of which option saves the most lives
leads to a “permissible” response in both versions of the dilemma.
Evidently, although adults tend to be more utilitarian with the
trolley dilemma than with the footbridge dilemma, they do not
base their moral evaluation on a utilitarian calculation.
According to the moral grammar theories, some principles
of the moral grammar guide our judgments in moral dilemmas
like the trolley problems. In particular, one of the principles
holds that an otherwise prohibited action, such as battery or
homicide, that has both good and bad effects, may be permissible
if the prohibited act itself is not directly intended. Hence, the
crucial difference between the footbridge dilemma and the trolley
dilemma is that the former involves battery as the intended
means: the choice is posited between committing a purposeful
battery in order to prevent five people from dying; the trolley
dilemma, instead, involves battery as a side-effect. Further,
relevant to our investigation, Mikhail (2011) argues that “the
distinction between intended means and foreseen side effect,
are invariant throughout the course of moral development, at
least between ages 8 and 65” (Mikhail, 2011, p. 349). From this
assumption descends the prediction that young children should
also find it more permissible to act with the trolley dilemma
than with the footbridge dilemma. Pellizzoni et al. (2010) invited
children aged 3–5 years to deal with both versions of the dilemma
and found that they were more likely to judge it right to act in the
trolley dilemma (pulling a cord) than in the footbridge dilemma
(pushing a person: 88 and 25%, respectively). They concluded
that children, like adults, conform to some of the principles
postulated by the moral grammar theories and that such a
continuity inmoral cognition supports the existence of a domain-
specific developmental mechanism rather than domain general
mechanisms. Alas, their study does not exclude the possibility
that the very young children in the experiment might have
responded to the questions in the moral dilemmas regardless of
the moral scenario to which the questions refer, namely merely
focusing on the question. Hence, they might have responded
affirmatively to the question “What is the right thing for Albert to
do? Pull the cord or not pull the cord?” because “pulling a cord”
per se is not an immoral action, and they might have responded
negatively to the question “What is the right thing for John to do?
Push the person or not push him?” because “pushing a person”
per se is an immoral action. An unpublished study described
by Mikhail (2011) has the same limit. The study was conducted
on 30 children aged 8–12 years and utilized a between-subject
design; each child encountered one of two moral dilemmas: in
one battery was intended and in one it was a side effect. The
task was to decide whether the proposed action was “wrong.”
The results revealed that the children dealing with the battery
as a side effect scenario were more likely to judge it right to act
than the children dealing with the intended battery scenario (93%
vs. 40% of the children, respectively). Also this study does not
exclude the possibility that the children might have responded
to the questions in the moral dilemmas merely focusing on the
question. Consistent with this explanation, the production of
“impermissible” judgments about the purposeful battery scenario
was at chance level (only 9 out of the 15 children judged the
action to be impermissible: Binomial test, p = 0.30, assuming
a prior probability of 0.5). It is possible that the children in
the study were too young to be able to comprehend the causal
scenarios described in the dilemmas, a question I will return to
when introducing the criteria used to select the experimental
populations in my experiments. The proposed interpretation
of the findings by Pellizzoni et al. (2010) and Mikhail (2011)
is consistent with the so-called action aversion hypothesis: the
condemnation of harmful actions, rather than deriving from
considering outcomes, can be driven by an aversive response to
the action itself (Miller et al., 2014; Patil, 2015).
Greene et al. (2001) advance a different explanation for adults
beingmore utilitarian with the trolley version than the footbridge
version of the dilemmas. He argues that a critical difference
is that the footbridge dilemma involves physical contact with
the victim but the trolley dilemma does not; killing without
physical contact makes the dilemma “less personal” and therefore
“less emotional,” so that the action to kill one person to save
five more lives is deemed permissible. Utilitarian responses to
personal dilemmas, instead, require the person to overcome an
emotional response against inflicting direct harm on another
person. The claim that emotions can affect our moral evaluations
is consistent with the socio-intuitionist theory according to which
emotions guide our evaluations. However, Greene et al. (2001,
2008) propose a different account from the socio-intuitionist
theory and argue that in some circumstances reasoning guides
our moral evaluations (see also Paxton and Greene, 2010;
Paxton et al., 2012); whereas personal dilemmas elicit intuitive
emotional responses that reflect concerns for right and duties,
impersonal dilemmas engage controlled cognitive processes that
support utilitarian judgments aimed at promoting the greater
good. Consistent with this assumption, neuroimaging studies
have revealed that brain areas associated with emotion are
significantly more active while dealing with personal dilemmas
than impersonal ones (Greene et al., 2001) whereas brain regions
associated with cognitive control exhibit increased activity
preceding utilitarian moral judgments made in response to
personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004).
Moral dilemmas have been less investigated within the mental
model framework. In one experiment by Bucciarelli et al. (2008;
Experiment 4) the participants dealt with a series of dilemmas
and carried out three tasks for each of them. First, they decided
whether or not the action was permissible. Second, they modified
the description of the dilemma so that they would switch
their evaluation from permissible to impermissible, or vice
versa. Third, they modified the description again to produce a
version of the dilemma that they were unable to resolve. The
results revealed that the participants readily modified dilemmas
to switch their judgments from permissible to impermissible,
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and vice versa. Similarly, they were able to modify them still
further to construct dilemmas that they would find impossible
to resolve. When naïve individuals construct a new version
of a dilemma, whether to switch an evaluation or to make
it impossible for them to resolve, they also appear to be
engaged in conscious reasoning. These results run against the
existence of a moral grammar; the grammar is incompatible
with the participants’ ability to construct strings of sentences
whose grammatical status is impossible for them to resolve.
Bucciarelli and colleagues concluded that their results support
the assumption that moral judgments are based on reasoning;
when dealing with moral dilemmas individuals reason upon the
mental models of alternative scenarios. This assumption has
been endorsed by recent studies. In particular, Waldmann and
Dieterich (2007) argue that individuals construct and reason
upon the causal models of the alternative scenarios described
in the dilemmas, and that the causal models have several
features that can affect moral judgments. In particular, the
dilemmas have different causal models depending on the locus
of the intervention; either the intervention influences the path
of the agent of harm (e.g., in the trolley dilemma) or the
intervention influences the path of the potential patient (e.g.,
in the footbridge dilemma). The participants in the experiments
dealt with four moral dilemmas including terrorist, medical and
military settings. The results of the experiments revealed that
an intervention which harmed a smaller number of people in
order to savemore people wasmore acceptable if the intervention
targeted the agent rather than the patient. The overall results of
the experiments suggest that a theory of moral reasoning based
on causal mental models can account for some aspects of moral
evaluations of moral dilemmas.
To sum up, the model theory, but not the socio-intuitionist or
the moral grammar theories, assumes that reasoning plays a role
in moral judgments.
Reasoning Upon Moral Dilemmas: A
Mental Model Account
Moral dilemmas present scenarios in which individuals have to
choose between two alternative possibilities, to act or not to
act, which both entail moral consequences. The classical moral
dilemmas explicitly mention the possibility in which the action is
performed, but not the one in which the action is not performed;
thus, on the basis of the findings by Legrenzi et al. (1993), they
focus individuals on such a possibility. Consider, for example, the
footbridge dilemma: “An empty boxcar is about to hit five people
standing on the rail track, and it will kill them. You can push a
man onto the track. Now, the boxcar will only hit that man and
kill him, but the five people on the rail track will be safe. Is it
right that you push the man?.” The dilemma states that “pushing
a man onto the track causes 1 person to die and 5 people are safe”
(i.e., the possibility in which the action is performed), but it does
not explicitly mention the possibility in which the action is not
performed.
My experiment on moral dilemmas manipulated four
variables that can foster “permissible” judgments. Indeed, besides
killing a person as an unintended consequence, other features of
the dilemma can foster “permissible” judgments (seeMoore et al.,
2011; Christensen et al., 2014):
No physical contact between the agent and the victim.
The action saves oneself along with others.
The agent is a third party, not the participant in the
experiment.
First, the moral dilemmas in my experiment manipulated the fact
of whether killing someone was an intended or an unintended
consequence. Second, they manipulated the fact of whether or
not there was physical contact between the protagonist and
the victim. Third, they manipulated the fact of whether or
not acting meant saving oneself along with others. Fourth,
they manipulated the fact of whether or not the agent was
a third party, not the participant in the experiment. As a
result, the anti-permissible version of the trolley dilemma in my
experiment is:
An empty boxcar is about to hit five people standing on the
rail track, and it will kill them. You can push a man onto the
track. Now, the boxcar will only hit that man and kill him, but
the five people on the rail track will be safe. Is it right that you
push the man?
The pro-permissible version of the trolley dilemma is:
An empty boxcar is about to hit and kill you and four other
people standing on the rail track. Frank can pull a lever that
sends the boxcar down another track, where it will kill one
man, but you and the four people will be safe. Is it right that
Frank pull the lever?
The assumptions of both the socio-intuitionist and moral
grammar theories lead to predict that children, as well as
adolescents and adults, are affected by the experimental
manipulation and are more utilitarian with the pro-permissible
versions of the dilemmas. According to the socio-intuitionist
theory the pro-permissible versions are less emotional than the
anti-permissible versions and, therefore, are more likely to lead
both children, adolescents, and adults to utilitarian judgments.
According to the moral grammar theories the pro-permissible
versions differ from the anti-permissible versions in terms of
universal principles that are at work from very early on in the
scenario (i.e., no physical contact with the victim and killing as
an unintended consequence vs. physical contact with the victim
and killing as an intended action); on these grounds children,
adolescents and adults should judge it more permissible to act
on utilitarian grounds with the pro-permissible version of the
dilemmas.
On the contrary, within the proposed mental model account
adults but not children should be affected by the experimental
manipulation; only individuals capable of deliberative reasoning
can be affected by the manipulation. The mental models of the
anti-permissible version of the dilemma represent the possibility
of one person being killed intentionally by the participant in
the experiment, with physical contact with the victim, and the
life of the participant in the experiment does not depend on
the action being performed (see Figure 1A). The mental models
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of the pro-permissible version of the dilemma represent the
possibility of one person being killed unintentionally, by a third
party rather than by the participant in the experiment, without
physical contact with the victim, and the life of the participant in
the experiment does depend on the action being performed (see
Figure 1B).
In line with Legrenzi et al. (1993), I assumed that the
manipulation of the four variables introduced above would affect
individuals’ judgments through mechanisms of focusing and
de-focusing: saving oneself along with others strengthens the
focus on the model representing the action, whereas being the
agent, intentional killing and physical contact with the victim
de-focus from the possibility of the action being performed,
leading the participant to make explicit the model representing
the possibility of the action not being performed. In particular,
consistent with the assumption of themodel theory that emotions
can contribute to moral evaluations, when the participants in the
experiment consider the possibility in which they are the agent
and kill through physical contact with the victim, the emotions
experienced with respect to this possibility may lead them to
make explicit the model representing the possibility in which the
action is not performed.
I assumed that in the anti-permissible versions of the
dilemmas focusing is reduced and de-focusing is increased, and
in the pro-permissible versions of the dilemmas focusing is
increased and de-focusing is reduced. From these assumptions
derives the prediction that the anti-permissible version is more
likely to lead reasoners to make fully explicit the alternative
possibility in which the action is not performed. Figure 2
illustrates the fully explicit mental models for both versions of
the dilemma.
The model theory for moral reasoning can easily be extended
to account for children’s moral judgments. Children construct
and reason upon the model of single possibilities; hence, they
rely on intuition, namely reasoning upon single possibilities.
As children grow up their cognitive resources increase and
they can rely on deliberation, namely reasoning upon multiple
possibilities. From this assumption descends the prediction
that children, more than adolescents and adults, are likely
to focus on the model of the possibility mentioned in the
premises of a dilemma, in which the action is performed,
and to give utilitarian judgments in both the pro-permissible
and the anti-permissible versions of the dilemmas. The
prediction for adolescents is that they should be affected by
the experimental manipulation more than children and less
than adults. Adults should be affected by the experimental
manipulation and be more utilitarian with the pro-permissible
version of the dilemmas than with the anti-permissible version;
in the latter case individuals are more likely to construct
the explicit models of the dilemma and therefore be able
to compare the attributes of the alternative possibilities, a
process that can result in either utilitarian or non-utilitarian
judgments. Hence, in my proposed framework utilitarian
responses can be grounded on intuitions, i.e., reasoning upon
single possibilities, as well as on deliberations, i.e., reasoning
upon multiple possibilities. In both cases, they are signs of
reasoning.
To sum up the predictions deriving from my assumptions:
Prediction 1: Children reason upon utilitarian grounds
regardless of the manipulation, thus justifying the means with
the ends in both the pro- and the anti-permissible versions of the
dilemmas.
Prediction 2: Adolescents and adults are affected by the
manipulation and are more utilitarian with the pro-permissible
versions of the dilemmas.
Prediction 3: With the increase in age individuals are
affected by the experimental manipulation: utilitarian responses
to both versions of dilemmas decrease, but the decrease in
utilitarian responses is greater for the anti-permissible versions
of the dilemmas. Thus, the difference between the number of
“permissible” responses to the pro-permissible version of the
dilemmas as compared to the anti-permissible version increases.
This research was approved by the Bioethic Committee of
Turin University. I tested my predictions on fifth-grade children,
adolescents aged 13–14 years, and adults. These age groups
have been found to differ in terms of cognitive abilities and
resources supporting reasoning abilities (see, e.g., Bara et al.,
1995). Children and adolescents took part in the experiment after
their parents had given their informed consent.
Experiment 1: Female Children are More
Utilitarian than Adults with Moral Dilemmas
The participants in the experiment encountered two versions of
a series of six dilemmas. In each dilemma acting meant killing
one person in order to save five others. I created two “extreme”
versions for each dilemma: a pro-permissible version and an
anti-permissible version. The pro-permissible version was less
personal and less emotional than the anti-permissible version;
hence, for the socio-intuitionist theory as well as for the dual
process theory of Greene et al., children as well as adolescents and
adults should be more likely to judge it permissible to act. At the
same time, the pro-permissible version and the anti-permissible
versions differed on the basis of several principles of the moral
grammar; the deriving prediction, also in this case, was that
children, adolescents and adults should be more likely to judge
it more permissible to act in the pro-permissible version. On
the contrary, from the assumption that individuals reason upon
moral dilemmas and children are more likely than adolescents
and adults to reason intuitively upon single possibilities, descends
the prediction that the pro-permissible versions should foster
“permissible” judgments in adults, but not in children. The two
extreme versions of the dilemmas were meant to increase the
participants’ sensitivity to their differences, a procedure that runs
against the assumption underlying the investigation, according
to which children are not sensitive to such differences and
are therefore more utilitarian than adults. The participants in
the children and in the adolescents groups were balanced by
gender, whereas those in the adult group were not: they were
all females but one. Hence, the experiment tested the prediction
that the pro-permissible versions of the dilemmas should foster
“permissible” judgments in female adults, but not in female
children.
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FIGURE 1 | The mental models of the possibilities in the anti-permissible (A) and pro-permissible (B) versions of the dilemma. The diagram in each figure
represents the alternative possibilities on opposite sides of a continuous line: the possibility in which the action is performed is represented through an explicit model;
the alternative possibility, in which the action is not performed, is not represented (implicit models, represented by dots).
FIGURE 2 | The fully explicit mental models of the anti-permissible (A) and the pro-permissible (B) versions of the dilemma. In each figure, the diagram
represents the alternative possibilities on opposite sides of a continuous line.
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For explorative purposes, the participants were also invited to
explain their choice. Although the justifications may reflect post
hoc rationalizations, it was interesting to see whether individuals
tended to justify their choice by appealing to cognitive reasons
rather than emotional factors (Bucciarelli and Daniele, 2015).
The principle of deontic reasoning postulates that all deontic
evaluations including those concerning matters of morality
depend on reasoning. This assumption implies that in deontic
decisions reasons are factors that motivate decisions and play a
more important role than emotional factors; the experimental
evidence is in favor of this assumption (see Shafir et al., 1993;
Green et al., 1999, respectively). The same considerations hold for
moral decisions; hence, when invited to explain their choice, the
participants, children included, should appeal to reasons rather
than emotional factors.
Methods
Participants
The aim of the experiment was to compare children’s,
adolescents’ and adults’ moral judgments: for this reason it was
necessary to assure that the participants in the different age
groups were homogeneous in terms of their social background.
Also, the experimental task required them to read and
comprehend the dilemmas: hence, it was necessary to exclude
any individuals with cognitive disabilities or dyslexia from the
sample.
Forty-two children in each of the following age groups were
randomly selected from the middle class pupils of two junior
schools in Turin, Italy: 9–10 years (21 females and 21 males;
mean age 9;7 years, sd = 0.24), 13–14 years (21 females and
21 males; mean age 13; 6 years, sd = 0.28), and forty-two
adults (41 females and one male; mean age 21 years, sd = 3.16).
Children were selected on the basis of their teachers’ assessment
that they had no cognitive disabilities or dyslexia. The home
background of the children attending the junior schools, which
were state schools situated in the city center, suggested that they
were likely to go to university. The adolescents attended state
high schools commonly considered to be an intermediate step
toward university. The adults were university students attending
a course in general psychology at the University of Torino. They
volunteered to take part in the experiment in exchange for course
credits.
Design
The moral dilemmas in the experiment were created from six
contents; one pro-permissible version and one anti-permissible
version was created for each content, for a total of 12 dilemmas.
Each participant encountered the two versions of the sixmoral
dilemmas in separate blocks, so that the two versions of the same
dilemma never occurred in the same block. In the overall group
of participants a version of a dilemma occurred equally often in
the first block and in the second block, and the dilemmas in each
block were presented in random order. Two non-moral scenarios
were used between the first block of dilemmas and the second
block in order to prevent the possibility of two versions of the
same dilemma being encountered in consecutive trials.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was carried out in Italian. The full set of
dilemmas is provided in Appendix A. An example of a dilemma
in the pro-permissible version is:
You and four swimmers are drowning. George can drive a
motorboat toward you at top speed. He will cause a passenger
to fall into the sea, but he will save all of you. The passenger will
drown because he cannot swim, but you and the four swimmers
will be safe.
Is it right that Giorgio drive at top speed ? (Yes/No)
The corresponding anti-permissible version is:
Five swimmers are drowning. You can drive a motorboat
toward them at top speed and save them if you lighten your
boat. You can do that by pushing one of your passengers into
the sea. He will drown because he cannot swim, but the five
swimmers will be safe.
Is it right that you drown your passenger? (Yes/No)
The experiment consisted of a single session that was carried
out individually in a quiet room, in the sole presence of the
experimenter. Each dilemma was printed on a sheet of paper, and
the sheets were assembled in a booklet, in random order. The
participants were instructed as follows: “This is an experiment
on how people make decisions. I am going to present you with 14
scenarios and for each scenario your task is to decide whether it
is right or wrong to perform a certain action. You have no time
limit. Furthermore, as soon as you reach a decision please explain
your choice.” The participants wrote their decision below each
scenario. The entire experimental session was audio-recorded.
Coding and Statistical Analyses
The “permissible” judgments in the two versions of the
dilemmas were analyzed in terms of frequencies. The normality
assumption was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The frequencies of the “Yes, it is permissible” responses by
the three groups of participants in the experiment were in
actual fact, not normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test determined that the frequencies of “permissible” responses
to both the anti-permissible and the pro-permissible versions
of the dilemmas did significantly differ from the normal
distribution [KS-test: df(42), d varied from 0.19 to 0.31, p
varied from <0.001 to <0.0001]. Statistical analyses were thus
performed using non-parametric statistical tests. The Cliff ’s
Delta statistic was used; such a non-parametric effect size
measure quantifies the amount of difference between two groups
of observations beyond p-values interpretation. The statistic
provides information about the magnitude of the difference
between the two groups of observations. If different ages
of the participants in the experiment (independent variables)
produce a statistically significant difference in the production of
“permissible” responses to the two versions of moral dilemmas
(dependent variables), the statistic quantifies such discrepancy.
Cliff ’s delta runs from -1 to +1. +1 means that all of the values
of one group are higher than all the values of the other, and -1
means the opposite. 0 means that the distributions are perfectly
overlapping. Generally, it is just reported the absolute value,
so Cliff ’s delta effectively ranges from 0 to 1.0. Assuming this,
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Romano et al. (2006) created these general guidelines for effect
sizes with Cliff ’s delta: negligible (0.00 < delta <0.14), small
(0.14 < delta <0.33), medium (0.33 < delta <0.47) and large
(0.47< delta< 1.0).
In the Results section are summarized the crucial statistical
comparisons.
If Prediction 1 holds true (children reason upon utilitarian
grounds regardless of themanipulation, thus justifying themeans
with the ends in both the pro- and the anti-permissible versions
of the dilemmas) then in the children group there should be
no statistically significant difference between the number of
“permissible” responses to the anti-permissible versions of the
dilemmas and those to the pro-permissible versions.
If Prediction 2 holds true (adolescents and adults are affected
by the manipulation and are more utilitarian with the pro-
permissible versions of the dilemmas) then in the groups of
adolescents and adults the number of “permissible” responses
to the pro-permissible versions of the dilemmas should be
greater than the number of “permissible” responses to the anti-
permissible versions of the dilemmas and the difference should
be statistically significant.
If Prediction 3 holds true (with the increase in age individuals
are affected by the experimental manipulation: utilitarian
responses to both versions of dilemmas decrease, but the decrease
in utilitarian responses is greater for the anti-permissible versions
of the dilemmas) then there should be statistically significant
trends in decrease of production of “permissible” judgments
from children to adolescents till adults with both versions of the
dilemmas, but there should be a statistically significant increase,
from children to adolescents till adults, in the difference between
the number of “permissible” responses to the pro-permissible
versions of the dilemmas as compared to the anti-permissible
versions.
The justifications provided by the participants for their
decisions were transcribed then coded independently by two
independent judges, blind to the aim of the experiment. They
were scored according to the following categories:
Cognitive reasons, either reasons such as justifying the
means by reference to the ends (utilitarian justifications) or
reasons rejecting or questioning such appeals (non-utilitarian
justifications). Examples of utilitarian protocols are: “Yes, in
order to save more people, which is better than saving just one”
(S1, children), “Yes, because although that person is innocent it is
better that one dies in place of five” (S14, adolescents). Examples
of non-utilitarian protocols are those in which the cognitive
reason is a moral principle (e.g., “It is wrong to kill”), the actor’s
ignorance of consequence (e.g., “The person whowill act does not
know that he is going to kill one person”), and discrediting the
consequence (e.g., “There is no reason why he should die because
the five people shouldn’t be on the train track”).
Emotional factors: the participant’s emotions with respect to
the means (e.g., “It would make me feel bad”).
Both cognitive reasons (either utilitarian or non-utilitarian)
and emotional factors (e.g., “I wouldn’t be able to push the person
who would be an innocent victim”).
Null justifications (e.g., repetition of what is stated in the
dilemmas; proposal of alternative solutions).
The two judges were instructed as follows: “A participant
might produce a justification in which she refers to rational
thoughts, personal opinions, norms and beliefs; this would be
a ‘cognitive reasons’ justification. There are two different types
of cognitive reasons; if they include achieving a good outcome
for the greater number of people, they are utilitarian, otherwise
they are non-utilitarian. Also, a participant might produce a
justification in which she refers to emotional states, moods,
and sentiments such as fear, shame, happiness. These emotional
elements must be explicitly mentioned in the justification;
this would be an ‘emotional factors’ justification. Finally, the
participant might produce a justification in which she refers
to both rational thoughts, personal opinions, norms, beliefs
and emotional states, moods, and sentiments; this would be a
‘cognitive reasons and emotional factors’ justification.”
In the Results section are summarized the crucial statistical
comparisons. They concern the percentages of type of
justifications provided by the participants when invited to
explain their choice. If, as implied by the assumptions of
model theory, reasons are factors that motivate decisions and
play a more important role than emotional factors, then the
justifications appealing to cognitive reasons should be more than
those appealing to emotional factors and the difference should
be statistically significant.
Results
Table 1 shows the percentage of responses in which the
participants gave a “Yes, it is right” response (hereafter
“permissible response”) for the two versions of the dilemmas.
Appendix A shows the results for each dilemma in the two
versions: anti-permissible and pro-permissible.
The crucial prediction was confirmed (Prediction 1): children
were not affected by the experimental manipulation: the
production of “permissible” judgments was comparable in the
two versions of the dilemmas (Wilcoxon test: z = 0.88, p> 0.250,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.02).
Still in line with the prediction, adolescents and adults
were affected by the experimental manipulation: they gave
more “permissible” judgments in the pro-permissible version as
compared with the anti-permissible version (Wilcoxon test: z =
TABLE 1 | The percentage of responses in which the participants gave a
“permissible” response for the two versions of the dilemmas in
Experiment 1.
Anti-permissible version Pro-permissible version
(n = 6) (n = 6)
Children 75% 80%
(N = 42) (189/252) (201/252)
Adolescents 36% 66%
(N = 42) (91/252) (166/252)
Adults 19% 49%
(N = 42) (47/252) (124/252)
The balance of the percentage were “No, it’s impermissible” responses.
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4.82, p < 0.001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.51, and z = 3.99, p < 0.001,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.50, respectively) (Prediction 2). Adolescents and
adults did not differ in terms of production of “permissible”
judgments in the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas (in
comparison with the anti-permissible version: Mann-Whitney
test on the difference between “permissible” judgments in pro-
permissible and anti-permissible version: z = 0.15, p > 0.250,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.31).
Figure 3 presents the means of “Yes, it is right” responses
to the two versions of the dilemmas by the three groups of
participants. The developmental prediction was also confirmed
(Prediction 3): in the anti-permissible version of the dilemmas
the production of “permissible” judgments decreased from
children, to adolescents to adults (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2 =
41.09, p < 0.001), and the Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc
comparisons revealed differences between all the three age groups
(p ranging from <0.02 to <0.0001). The same result held for
the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas: the production of
“permissible” judgments decreased from children, to adolescents
to adults (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2 = 16.44, p < 0.001) and the
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed differences
between all the three age groups (p ranging from <0.03 to
<0.05).
Further, the difference between the number of “permissible”
responses to the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas and the
anti-permissible version increased with age (Jonckheere’s trend
test over the three age groups of differences between each subject’s
number of “permissible” responses to pro-permissible version
minus number of “permissible” responses to anti-permissible
version: z = 3.58, p < 0.001). Finally, the participants in
each age group differed reliably in giving “permissible” judgments
in the 12 dilemmas (Friedman non-parametric analysis of
variance, χ2 ranging from 37.74 to 122.87, df = 11, p always
<0.0001).
A detailed analysis of the pairs of dilemmas revealed that
for all pairs adults chose “permissible” more for the pro-
permissible versions than for the anti-permissible versions. But,
no such uniformity was observed among the children. This
FIGURE 3 | The means of “Yes, it is right” responses to the two
versions of the dilemmas by the three groups of participants in
Experiment 1.
suggests that they were not sensitive to the difference between
the pro- and anti-versions of the dilemmas. This, in turn,
suggests that they did not really think very hard in order to
make their decision. This result supported the assumption that
children base their evaluations on intuitions rather than on
deliberations.
There are three possible confounds in the experiment. (1)
Differently from the other dilemmas, in dilemma 2 the potential
victims were children. (2) The participants in the adults group
were not balanced by gender. (3) The agent in the anti-
permissible version of the dilemmas was neutral whereas in the
pro-permissible version he was always a male. Three series of
statistical analyses were conducted to exclude where possible
these confounds.
In dilemma 2 the potential victims were children. A detailed
analysis of the pairs of dilemmas revealed that the participants in
the experiment were particularly prone to judging it permissible
to act with dilemma 2. As a matter of fact, dilemma 2 differed
from the others in that the potential victims were children. The
overall results, according to which children were more utilitarian
than adults, could be due to the fact that in dilemma 2 children
were more likely to identify themselves with the potential victims
and judge it permissible to act in order to save them. This
possibility can be excluded: the difference between children’s and
adults’ performance on dilemma 2 was smaller than for the other
dilemmas. Children gave 86 and 90% of “permissible” judgments
in the pro-permissible and the anti-permissible versions of
dilemma 2, respectively, and 79 and 72% of “permissible”
judgments in the pro-permissible and anti-permissible versions
of the other dilemmas, respectively. Adults gave 69 and 48%
of “permissible” judgments in the pro-permissible and the anti-
permissible versions of dilemma 2, respectively, and 45 and
13 of “permissible” judgments in the pro-permissible and the
anti-permissible versions of the other dilemmas, respectively.
A comparison between children and adults revealed that the
difference in performance with the two versions of the dilemmas
was smaller for dilemma 2 than for the other dilemmas (Mann-
Whitney test on the difference between “permissible” judgments
in the pro-permissible and anti-permissible versions of dilemma
2minus the difference between “permissible” judgments in the
pro-permissible and anti-permissible versions of all the other
dilemmas, and the same difference for adults: z = 3.19,
p < 0.001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.39). Thus, the inclusion of
dilemma 2 in the analyses of the results of the experiment ran
against, rather than in favor of, the main prediction of the
experiment.
The participants in the adults group were not balanced
by gender. The participants in the adults group were all but
one females. Recent findings have suggested that males are
more utilitarian than females (Friesdorf et al., 2015); if this was
the case in our experimental samples, then children resulted
more utilitarian than adults simply because almost all of the
adults were females. This possibility can be excluded: the
results when considering only the females in the three groups
of participants replicate the overall results. Table 2 shows the
percentage of responses in which the female participants in
Experiment 1 gave a “permissible response” for the two versions
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TABLE 2 | The percentage of responses in which the female participants
gave a “permissible” response for the two versions of the dilemmas in
Experiment 1.
Anti-permissible version Pro-permissible version
(n = 6) (n = 6)
Children females 75% 79%
(N = 21) (95/126) (100/126)
Adolescent females 33% 60%
(N = 21) (42/126) (76/126)
Adult females 17% 49%
(N = 41) (43/246) (120/246)
The balance of the percentage were “No, it’s impermissible” responses.
of the dilemmas. The crucial prediction was still confirmed
(Prediction 1): children were not affected by the experimental
manipulation: the production of “permissible” judgments was
comparable in the two versions of the dilemmas (Wilcoxon test:
z = 0.30, p > 0.250, Cliff ’s δ = 0.11). Adolescents and
adults were affected by the experimental manipulation: they give
more “permissible” judgments in the pro-permissible version as
compared with the anti-permissible version (Wilcoxon test: z =
3.37, p < 0.001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.44, and z = 4.61, p < 0.0001,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.55, respectively) (Prediction 2). Adolescents and
adults did not differ in terms of production of “permissible”
judgments in the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas (in
comparison with the anti-permissible version: Mann-Whitney
test on the difference between “permissible” judgments in pro-
permissible and anti-permissible version: z = 0.41, p > 0.250,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.03).
The developmental prediction was also confirmed (Prediction
3): in the anti-permissible version of the dilemmas we observed
a decrease in the production of “permissible” judgments from
children, to adolescents to adults (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2 =
29.58, p < 0.0001), and the Bonferroni-corrected post-
hoc comparisons revealed differences between children and
adolescents and between children and adults (p < 0.001
and <0.0001, respectively), but not between adolescents and
adults (p = 0.13). Also, in the pro-permissible version of the
dilemmas we observed a decrease in production of “permissible”
judgments from children, to adolescents to adults (Kruskal-
Wallis test: x2 = 10.24, p < 0.006) and the Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed differences between
children and adults (p < 0.001), but not between children
and adolescents and children and adults (p = 0.08 and 0.25,
respectively).
Further, the difference between the number of “permissible”
responses to the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas as
compared to the anti-permissible version increased with age
(Jonckheere’s trend test over the three age groups of differences
between each subject’s number of “permissible” responses to pro-
permissible version minus number of “permissible” responses
to anti-permissible version: z = 3.03, p < 0.001).
Finally, the participants in each age group differed reliably in
giving “permissible” judgments in the 12 dilemmas (Friedman
non-parametric analysis of variance, χ2 ranging from 22.67 to
123.54, df = 11, p varied from<0.02 to<0.0001).
Two non-parametric ANCOVA analyses where the effects
of gender was removed by entering gender as a covariate
revealed that the main effect of group still persisted for utilitarian
responses to the anti-permissible version of the dilemmas
[Quade’s test: F(2, 123) = 28.69, p < 0.0001] and for
utilitarian responses to the pro-permissible versions [Quade’s
test: F(2, 123) = 6.35, p < 0.002]. However, having entered gender
as a covariate and accounted for variance associated with this
variable, this only accounts for children and adolescents (which
are gender-balanced anyway), but not for the adults group in
which there is zero variance associated with males. Thus, the
experimental predictions held for females and the results cannot
be generalized to males.
The agent in the anti-permissible versions was neutral
whereas in the pro-permissible versions he was always a male.
If the participants in the experiment were likely to identify
themselves with a same-gender agent in the scenarios, then they
gave less “permissible” judgments in dilemmas in which the agent
was of their same gender. As the agent in the anti-permissible
versions was neutral whereas in the pro-permissible versions
he was always a male, this possible same-gender effect can be
explored for children and adolescents, who were balanced by
gender. In particular, we were able to verify whether the males
in the children and adolescents groups were more likely to judge
it impermissible to act with the pro-permissible versions of the
dilemmas, where the agent was a male, as compared to the
females. An analysis detailed for children revealed that females
and males did not differ in terms of production of “permissible”
judgments in the pro-permissible version of the dilemmas (79
and 80% of permissible judgments, respectively) in comparison
with the anti-permissible version (75% of permissible judgments
for both genders: Mann-Whitney test on the difference between
“permissible” judgments in pro-permissible and anti-permissible
version: z = 0.23, p > 0.250, Cliff ’s δ = 0.06). The same result
held for the adolescents: females andmales did not differ in terms
of production of “permissible” judgments in the pro-permissible
version of the dilemmas (60 and 71% of permissible judgments,
respectively) in comparison with the anti-permissible version (33
and 39% of permissible judgments, respectively: Mann-Whitney
test on the difference between “permissible” judgments in pro-
permissible and anti-permissible version: z = 0.77, p > 0.250,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.14).
The justifications of the participants in the experiment for
their choices also concurred to uphold the assumptions of the
model theory. The two independent judges who coded the
participants’ justifications for their choices agreed in their coding
in 91% of cases (Cohen’s K = 0.87, p < 0.0001). For the final
score, they discussed each item on which they disagreed, until
reaching a full agreement.
Table 3 shows examples of coding and the percentages of
the different types of justifications by the three groups of
participants. The protocols were retrospective, and so they
cannot refute Haidt’s position. Nevertheless, they revealed that
children appealed to cognitive reasons more than emotional
factors in justifying their decision. And indeed, if we do not
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TABLE 3 | Examples of verbal protocols for the main categories of justifications and relative percentages in the three groups of participants in
Experiment 1.
Type of justification Example protocol Example dilemma
Cognitive reasons Yes, I save more persons (S15, Adults)
No because I could go in prison (Children, S38)
Yes, if the man is able to sacrifice himself
(Adolescents, S30)
An empty boxcar is about to hit five people
standing on the rail track, and it will kill them.
You can push a man onto the track. Now, the
boxcar will hit only that man and kill him, but
the five people on the rail track will be safe. Is it
right that you push the man?
Chi Ado Adu
67% 66% 57%
(337/503*) (329/502*) (288/504)
Util. 70% 45% 32%
(236/337) (149/329) (93/288)
Non-util. 30% 55% 68%
(101/337) (180/329) (195/288)
Emotional factors
Chi Ado Adu
7% 6% 8%
(34/503*) (31/502*) (41/504)
No because pushing a person against a jib
shocks me, also to see the person who dies
(Children, S1)
No I do not want to be an assassin and bear on
my conscience a death caused by myself. I
wouldn’t feel to do that (Adolescents, S22)
Yes, although the worker may have a family, in
that case I would feel sorry (Adolescents, S15)
The jib of a crane is moving and will kill five
workers. You can push one worker against the
jib. Now the jib will stop when killing the worker.
The worker will die, but the other five workers
will be safe. Is it right that you push the worker?
Cognitive reasons plus emotional factors
Chi Ado Adu
2% 3% 5%
(9/503*) (14/502*) (23/504)
I’m sorry for the 5 persons who will trample on
the bomb, but if that was their destiny I don’t
want to be involved by killing one person in
their place (Adolescent, S1)
There is a bomb on a country road. It is not yet
exploded. If it will be trampled on, the bomb
will exploded. If you push a person on the
bomb, the person will die, but five people who
are arriving and will trample on the bomb will be
safe. Is it right that you push the person?
Null justifications No because I could advise them (Children, S9)
Chi Ado Adu
24% 25% 30%
(123/503*) (128/502*) (152/504)
*(One children did not justify one response, and one adolescent did not justify two responses).
consider null justifications and consider an a priori probability
of producing a cognitive justification of 1/3, children (37 out of
42), along with adolescents (34 out of 42) and adults (27 out
of 42), produced cognitive justifications more often than chance
(significant proportions on binomial test: p always <0.0007).
As a general result, over all participants and over all dilemmas,
62% of the justifications referred to cognitive reasons, 7% to
emotional factors, and 3% to both. The remaining 21% were
null justifications, namely protocols in which the participants
repeated the premises or proposed alternative solutions for
exiting the dilemmas.
Leaving aside null justifications, more justifications referred
to cognitive reasons than to emotional factors or both cognitive
reasons and emotional factors (Wilcoxon test: z = 9.49, p <
0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.94, z = 9.73, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.98,
respectively). The same results hold when considering the three
age groups separately. More justifications referred to cognitive
reasons than to emotional factors or both cognitive reasons and
emotional factors in children (Wilcoxon test: z = 5.39, p <
0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.94, z = 5.65, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ =
0.99, respectively), in adolescents (Wilcoxon test: z = 5.65,
p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.96, z = 5.65, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s
δ = 0.98, respectively), and in adults (Wilcoxon test: z = 5.498,
p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.92, z = 5.63, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ =
0.97, respectively). Further, justifications appealing to cognitive
reasons did not increase with age (Jonckheere trend test: J = 2934,
z = 1.29, p = 0.099).
A subcategory of cognitive reasons justifications are those
appealing to utilitarian considerations. In line with the results
revealing that children are more utilitarian than adults, the
analysis of the justifications revealed that that utilitarian
justifications for “permissible” responses decreased with age:
62% for children, 52% for adolescents, and 41% for adults
(Jonckheere trend test: J = 1820.50, z = 2.47, p = 0.007). This
result suggests that children base their utilitarian judgment on
utilitarian cognitive reasons.
Discussion
The overall results of the experiment confirmed the prediction
that with classical moral dilemmas female children are more
utilitarian than female adults; as the participants in the adults
group were not balanced by gender, at the moment the results
cannot be generalized to males. The results are consistent
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with the model theory’s assumption that children’s difficulty in
constructing the fully explicit mental models of the alternative
possibilities leads them to be utilitarian regardless of the
experimental manipulation. However, one could argue that
children’s utilitarian judgments in Experiment 1 might reflect
a bias toward action rather than genuine reasoning upon a
single possibility. The aim of Experiment 2 was to discard this
possibility.
Experiment 2: A Bias to Act Cannot Explain
Female Children’s Utilitarian Responses
with Moral Dilemmas
The participants in the experiment encountered a series of pairs
of dilemmas in which the choice was again between whether
to act or not. In one version of the dilemmas the action was
directed at sacrificing one person to save five (pro-utilitarian
version) and in one version the action was directed to sacrificing
five people in order to save one (anti-utilitarian version). Since
acting means saving one person and killing five, if children
reason they should decide not to act and simply consider the
alternative model in which the action is negated; the decision
can be made without constructing the fully explicit models of the
alternative possibilities (see Legrenzi et al., 1993). In Experiment
2, like in Experiment 1, males were not properly represented in
the group of adults, but in this case what is not allowed is a
proper comparison between children’s and adults’ performance
depending on gender. The experiment is apt to exclude the
possibility that children, both females and males, are biased to
act with moral dilemmas.
Methods
Participants
Twenty children aged from 9 to 10 years (10 females and 10
males; mean age 9;4 years, sd = 0.31) and 20 adults (19
females and 1 male; mean age 23 years, sd = 5.34) took
part in the experiment. The children were randomly selected
from the middle class pupils of a junior school in Turin, Italy,
according to the same criteria adopted in Experiment 1. The
adult participants were university students attending a course in
general psychology and took part in the experiment voluntarily
in exchange for course credits. None of the participants had taken
part in Experiment 1.
Material and Procedures
The participants were presented with the pro-permissible
dilemmas used in Experiment 1 and were invited to decide
whether the action was right. However, unlike in the pro-
permissible dilemmas in Experiment 1, this version did not
include saving oneself along with others. The reason was to avoid
that, as a result of the experimental manipulation, in the anti-
utilitarian version of the dilemmas a possible choice was acting to
kill oneself. Also, in dilemma 2, the five victims were no longer
children, but adults, to make the dilemmas more homogeneous.
Two versions of each of these dilemmas were created: one in
which acting meant saving five people instead of one (action pro-
utilitarian), and one in which acting meant saving one person
instead of five (action anti-utilitarian) (see Appendix B for the
full set of dilemmas). Six pairs of the following sorts of dilemmas
were obtained:
Action pro-utilitarian:
An empty boxcar is about to hit five people standing on the
rail track.
Franco can pull a lever that will send the boxcar down another
track, where there is a man, the man will be killed, but the five
people will be safe.
Is it right that Franco pull the lever? (Yes/No)
Action anti-utilitarian:
An empty boxcar is about to hit one person standing on the
rail track.
Lina can pull a lever that will send the boxcar down another
track, where there are five men, the five men will be killed, but
that one person will be safe.
Is it right that Lina pull the lever? (Yes/No)
Each participant encountered all the moral dilemmas in two
blocks, so that the two versions of the same dilemma never
occurred in the same block. Two scenarios involving a non-
moral choice were used between the first block of dilemmas and
the second block to exclude the possible occurrence of the two
versions of the same dilemma in consecutive trails. In the overall
group of participants a version of a dilemma occurred equally
often in the first block and in the second block. The task for
each participant was to decide whether or not the action was
right. The participants were instructed as follows: “This is an
experiment on how people make decisions. I am going to present
you with 14 scenarios and for each scenario your task is to decide
whether it would be right or not to perform an action. You have
no time limit.” The participants wrote their decision below each
scenario.
Coding and Statistical Analyses
The “permissible” judgments in the two versions of the
dilemmas were analyzed in terms of frequencies. The normality
assumption was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The frequencies of the “Yes, it is permissible” responses by the
two groups of participants in the experiment were in part not
normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determined
that the frequencies of “permissible” responses to the pro-
utilitarian versions of the dilemmas did not significantly differ
from the normal distribution [KS-test: df(20), d = 0.19 and 0.18,
p = 0.14 and 0.05 in children and adults, respectively]. But the
test determined that the frequencies of “permissible” responses
to the anti-utilitarian versions of the dilemmas did significantly
differ from the normal distribution [KS-test: df(20), d = 0.31
and 0.37, p always<0.0001, in children and adults, respectively].
Statistical analyses were thus performed using non-parametric
statistical tests.
In the Results section are summarized the crucial statistical
comparisons. If children and adults are not biased to act
when dealing with the moral dilemmas then the number of
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“permissible” responses should be greater in the pro-utilitarian
versions compared to the anti-utilitarian versions and the
difference should be statistically significant. Indeed, if children
like adults reason when dealing with the dilemmas, they realize
that acting in the pro-utilitarian versions means killing one
person and saving five, whereas acting in the anti-utilitarian
versions means saving one person and killing five.
Results
The overall results revealed a significant production of
“permissible” responses in the pro-utilitarian version of the
dilemmas: an overall 60% as compared with an overall 10% for
“permissible” responses in the anti-utilitarian version (Wilcoxon
test: z = 5.25, p < 0.001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.82). An analysis by
single age group confirmed the results in both children (60%
vs. 10%: Wilcoxon test: z = 3.84, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.86)
and adults (60% vs. 10%: Wilcoxon test: z = 3.64, p < 0.001,
Cliff ’s δ = 0.78). The participants differed reliably in giving
“permissible” judgments in the 12 dilemmas: this result holds
for children and adults (Friedman non-parametric analysis
of variance, χ2 = 80.67 and 94.29, respectively, df = 11,
p < 0.0001 in both cases).
There were two possible confounds in Experiment 2. (1) The
participants in the adults group were not balanced by gender.
(2) The agent in the pro-utilitarian versions of the dilemmas was
always a male, and the agent in the anti-utilitarian versions of the
dilemmas was always a female. Two series of statistical analyses
were conducted to exclude where possible these confounds.
The participants in the adults group were not balanced by
gender. An analysis of the results limited to the females in the
experiment excluded the possibility that the females participants
in Experiment 1 were biased to act. The analysis revealed a
significant production of “permissible” responses in the pro-
utilitarian version of the dilemmas: an overall 57% as compared
with an overall 9% for “permissible” responses in the anti-
utilitarian version (Wilcoxon test: z = 4.39, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s
δ = 0.77). An analysis by single age group confirmed the results
in both children (55% vs. 10%: Wilcoxon test: z = 2.68, p =
0.007, Cliff ’s δ = 0.73) and adults (59% vs. 9%: Wilcoxon test:
z = 3.53, p < 0.0001, Cliff ’s δ = 0.78). The participants
differed reliably in giving “permissible” judgments in the 12
dilemmas: this result holds for children and adults (Friedman
non-parametric analysis of variance, χ2 = 37.70 and 89.24,
respectively, df = 11, p < 0.0001 in both cases).
The agent in the pro-utilitarian versions of the dilemmas was
always a male, and the agent in the anti-utilitarian versions of
the dilemmas was always a female. The aim of Experiment 2
was to discard the possibility that children had a bias to act. One
could object to the conclusion that the results of Experiment 2
discard this possibility. Indeed, the agent in the pro-utilitarian
versions of the dilemmas was always a male, and the agent in the
anti-utilitarian versions of the dilemmas was always a female. If
the participants in the experiment identified themselves with the
agent in the scenarios, in particular the females with the female
agent in the anti-utilitarian dilemmas and the males with the
male agent in the pro-utilitarian versions of the dilemmas, then
males would give less “permissible” judgments in pro-utilitarian
versions than females, and females would give less “permissible”
judgments in anti-utilitarian versions than males. An analysis by
gender in the group of children revealed no interaction: females
and males did not differ in terms of production of “permissible”
judgments in the pro-utilitarian version of the dilemmas (55%
and 65% of permissible judgments, respectively) in comparison
with the anti-utilitarian version (10% of permissible judgments
in both groups: Mann-Whitney test on the difference between
“permissible” judgments in pro-utilitarian and anti-utilitarian
versions: z = 0.54, p> 0.250, Cliff ’s δ = 0.14).
Discussion
The results of the experiment ruled out the possibility that
females children might be utilitarian merely because they were
biased toward action in general. Yet, it is surprising that 10% of
children’s and adults’ responses consisted in deeming it morally
right to act in order to save one person in place of five. An
analysis of the results by single dilemma (see Appendix B) shed
light on this result. Such responses were most frequent with the
anti-utilitarian version of dilemma 2, which differed from the
other anti-utilitarian dilemmas in which the potential victims
(the one person and the five people) would have died through
the same means. In this dilemma, the one person would die by
being burnt in the house, whereas the five people would die due
to the breaking of the window. It is possible that the means by
which the potential victims would have died affected the moral
evaluation.
General Discussion
The main assumption underlying the present investigation was
that making a moral decision in a moral dilemma involves the
construction of the mental models of the alternative possibilities
it describes: a model of the action (to sacrifice one person in
order to save five people, a utilitarian decision) and an alternative
model in which the action is not performed (five people die and
one person is safe). When reasoning requires keeping multiple
models in mind, we tend to think about them one at a time, and
a focusing effect leads us to think about the model representing
the possibility explicitly mentioned in the premises. Hence, when
dealing with a moral dilemma individuals represent a fully
explicit model of the possibility mentioned in the premises,
in which the action is being performed. The manipulation
of some variables involved in the alternative possibilities can
lead individuals to focus on the model in which the action is
performed and defocus from the alternative model, or to defocus
from the model in which the action is performed and focus
on the alternative model representing inaction. A precondition
for the effectiveness of the manipulation is that the individual
has the capacity to represent and bear in mind the models of
the alternatives described; this capacity increases with age. The
theory predicts that children are not affected by the experimental
manipulation and always focus on the possibility mentioned
in the premises, in which the action is performed. In other
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words, children are utilitarian regardless of the experimental
manipulation of the alternatives in the dilemmas.
In Experiment 1, the alternatives in the dilemmas were
manipulated to obtain two “extreme” versions: for both the
socio-intuitionist theory and the moral grammar theories the
pro-permissible versions should foster more utilitarian responses
than the anti-permissible versions in children as well as in
adolescents and adults. On the contrary, my assumption led
to the prediction that children would not be affected by
experimental manipulation, unlike adolescents and adults. As a
consequence children aremore utilitarian than adults. The results
of Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction for females. On the
basis of the assumption of model theory there is no reason to
expect that the prediction do not hold also for males, but in order
to generalize the present results to males it would be necessary
to include more males participants in the adults group of the
study. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that females children
in Experiment 1 were simply biased to act; when presented with
dilemmas in which acting ran against utilitarian considerations,
they judged it impermissible to act.
Within the proposed theoretical framework utilitarian
judgments can be the result of intuition as well as of deliberation,
both types of reasoning. This claim is inconsistent with that
of Greene et al. (2001; 2004) according to which deontological
judgments in moral dilemmas (refraining from harm) are
fast and emotion-based, while utilitarian judgments (deciding
to harm) are slow because they are the result of deliberative
reasoning. However, consistent with my claim Christensen et al.
(2014) conducted a study on moral judgment controlling four
conceptual factors, among which the instructions given to the
participant and the length and expression style of the dilemma,
and found that “both deontological and utilitarian decisions
can be made equally fast, and both to personal and impersonal
dilemmas” (ibidem, p. 16).
The socio-intuitionist theory is not able to explain the results
concerning children’s judgments inmoral dilemmas. The theory’s
assumptions led to the prediction that, when dealing with moral
dilemmas, children, adolescents, and adults would be guided
by their emotional reactions. But, if so, they should judge it
impermissible to perform the action described in the anti-
permissible versions of the dilemmas, in which the participants
in the experiment are the agent, they kill intentionally, and
killing occurs with physical contact with the victim thus making
the dilemmas more personal and therefore “more emotional”
(Greene et al., 2001). The theory might explain children’s
utilitarian responses by assuming that they do not empathize
with the victims in a dilemma; indeed, studies have revealed that
damage to the prefrontal cortex mediating emotional responses
increases utilitarian moral judgments (Koenigs et al., 2007).
But this explanation is rather implausible, as empathy can be
observed in very young infants from the age of 6 months (Hay
et al., 1981). Previous studies have revealed that adult individuals
scoring high on measures of antisocial personality traits are
more likely to endorse utilitarian solutions to dilemmas (Bartels
and Pizarro, 2011); it would be possible, although difficult, for
the socio-intuitionist theory to argue that children have higher
antisocial personality traits than adults. Consistent with my
assumption that mere emotions cannot resolve the dilemmas,
a study by Nakamura (2013) revealed that differences in moral
judgments in the trolley and the footbridge dilemmas have to
be attributed to differences in rational processing rather than
differences in emotional involvement. The participants in the
study encountered a set of moral dilemmas used in Greene
et al. (2001) distinguished between personal and impersonal
dilemmas. Nakamura analyzed the correlation structure among
the dilemmas through factor analysis and structural equation
modeling. The results suggest that the difference between the
two kinds of dilemmas is owing to the varying involvement of
the rational reasoning process rather than the extent to which
they engage the emotional process. Further, still consistent with
the results of the present investigation, the findings reported by
Royzman et al. (2011 Experiment 2) suggest that reasoning has a
greater role than emotions in moral dilemmas. The participants
in their experiment encountered two moral dilemmas where the
protagonist was faced with two alternative courses of action:
to perform or not incestuous sexual intercourse in order to
prevent serious harm to another person. For each dilemma, the
participants had to: (1) judge which course of action would be the
morally right one to take, (2) imagine the two different courses
of action the protagonist could take and rate their affective
responses to each, (3) check which of the two courses of action
available to the protagonist carries greater overall costs for all
concerned. The results revealed that the relative costs associated
with the alternative courses of action under consideration were a
significant determinant of the moral judgment in the dilemmatic
context. Hence, Royzman and colleagues concluded that the
evaluation of moral dilemmas eliciting strong and conflicting
emotions relies onmoral rules which are not necessarily linked to
strong emotions (see also Royzman et al., 2009). These findings
support the assumption of the model theory that emotions and
reasoning are two systems working in parallel (see also Gubbins
and Byrne, 2014).
The moral grammar theories are not able to explain the
results of the present investigation. Their assumptions led
to the prediction that individuals of any age should be
sensitive to the experimental manipulation of the two alternative
possibilities in amoral dilemma; the variables physical contact/no
physical contact with the victim, and killing as an unintended
consequence/as an intended action, should affect individuals’
performance because they reflect principles of a universal moral
grammar at work from very early on in the development process.
However, the results of the present investigation are in line with
the predictions derived from the proposed extension of themodel
theory: the experimental manipulation did not affect children.
Therefore, it is likely that the manipulations affect the reasoning
process through universal cognitive mechanisms (on this line
of argumentation, see also Cushman and Young, 2011), which
exploit the ability to represent fully explicit mental models.
In conclusion, the results of the present investigation
corroborate a prediction descending from the assumptions of the
model theory but not from the assumptions of the competing
theories: female children are more utilitarian than female adults.
Also, the results support the theory’s assumption that moral
judgments mainly rely on reasoning rather than emotions or
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innate moral principles; they reflect general cognitive capacities,
such as the ability to represent and to reason about multiple
possibilities, which become more sophisticated with age and
underlie moral judgments.
The present investigation has three main limits that future
studies might overcome.
First, I assumed that children, unlike adults, would not be
affected by experimental manipulation of the two alternative
possibilities described in the moral scenarios. I constructed the
experimental material running against my prediction: I needed
to show that even when the two versions of the dilemmas differed
on a series of dimensions so as to be “extreme” versions of the
dilemmas, children were not sensitive to such manipulation.
Hence, what is lacking in the present investigation is a focus on
the possible different roles played by the different variables in
determining focusing and de-focusing effects with respect to the
possibilities described by the moral scenarios. Further studies
are needed to explore the possible different contributions
of the variables of the reasoning process investigated
here.
The second limit of the present investigation is that the
participants in the adults groups were not balanced by gender
and, therefore, I tested the experimental predictions on females
and the results cannot be generalized to males. A possible future
step in this investigation would be the inclusion of more males
in the adults group. Yet, a relevant result is that if we consider
the groups of children and adolescents in which the participants
were balanced by gender, children, both females and males, were
more utilitarian even than adolescents. And, indeed, within the
proposed theoretical framework there is no reason to expect that
females and males differ in general cognitive capacities such as
the ability to represent and reason about multiple possibilities:
the cognitive mechanism has to be the same.
The third limit of the investigation is that the social
background of the participants in the different age groups was
controlled: they were middle-class individuals. It is possible that
individuals are more or less likely to be sensitive to the variables
manipulated in the present investigation depending on their
social class and culture. The model theory for deontic reasoning
is domain-general, but allows for the possibility of moral contents
and contexts differing across cultures (see, Khemlani et al., 2010).
In this sense, culture rather than gender could be the key to
understanding differences in the result of the reasoning process
since culture could concur to determine the content on which
individuals are disposed to reason.
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